Monday, October 28, 2019

Under Armour, Inc. v. Battle Fashions, Inc. (Maryland U.S.D.C.)


Filed: July 18, 2019

Opinion by: Richard D. Bennett

Summary: Under Armour, Inc. (“Under Armour”) filed a lawsuit seeking, among other things, a declaration that its use of certain phrases in connection with its products does not infringe upon a registered trademark owned by defendant Kelsey Battle (“Battle”).  Battle, a resident of North Carolina, moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.  After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the Eastern District of North Carolina.

Analysis:  The court initially denied Battle’s motion to dismiss, holding that the requisite preliminary prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction had been made.  However, after holding a pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the court found that personal jurisdiction over Battle had not been established by the requisite preponderance of the evidence.  The court began its analysis of personal jurisdiction by noting that two conditions must be satisfied in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident: (1) the exercise of jurisdiction must be authorized under Maryland’s long-arm statute [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Procs. § 6-103(b)]; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.  As to that two-pronged analysis, the court noted that Maryland courts “have consistently held that the state’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set out by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution,” but that courts must address both prongs of the analyses.

As to the first prong of the analysis, the court noted that “a plaintiff must specifically identify a provision in the Maryland long-arm statute that authorizes jurisdiction”.  Here, Under Armour argued the existence of personal jurisdiction over Battle based on his transacting business in Maryland [Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Procs. § 6-103(b)(1)].  Noting that “Maryland courts have construed the phrase ‘transacting business’ narrowly, requiring, for example, significant negotiations or intentional advertising and selling in the forum state”, the court found that a small number of sales by Battle to Maryland consumers, two cease and desist letters sent by Battle to Under Armour in Maryland, and three letters sent by Battle to parties outside of Maryland in order to “put pressure” on Under Armour were insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under Maryland’s long-arm statute.

As to the second prong of the personal jurisdiction analysis, the court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a defendant have certain minimum contacts with the jurisdiction “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”  Acknowledging that there was no basis to assert “general” or “all-purpose” jurisdiction over Battle, the court focused its analysis on “specific” jurisdiction, which requires that the action “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contracts with the forum.”  Here, the controversy did not relate to marketing or selling infringing products in the forum but instead related to the activities of Battle in enforcing his trademark.  Accordingly, the court’s analysis focused on whether the two cease and desist letters sent to Maryland and the three letters sent to parties outside of Maryland were sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over Battle in Maryland.  As to the letters sent to Under Armour in Maryland, the court held that “cease-and-desist letters alone are insufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction.”  The court then noted that “enforcement activities taking place outside the forum state do not give rise to personal jurisdiction in the forum.”  Based on that premise, the court held that the three letters sent to parties outside of Maryland did not give rise to personal jurisdiction over Battle because those letters “did not threaten litigation, had no effect on Under Armour’s business, and did not result in any damage to Under Armour’s business relationships.”

The full opinion is available in PDF.

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