Filed: December 18, 2018
Opinion by: Barbera, C.J.
Holding:
The Maryland Consumer Loan Law (“MCLL”) is considered an “other specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-102(a)(6), so any MCLL claim has a twelve-year statute of limitations.
Facts:
Two consumers financed the purchase of their vehicles through loans under $6,000. The consumers brought a putative class action against a lender for violating the MCLL. The MCLL provides, among other matters, that a person may not engage in the business of making loans unless the person is licensed or meets certain exemptions. The consumers alleged that the lender was unlicensed under the MCLL. They further alleged that the lender failed to provide notice of repossession, as well as charged compound interest and inappropriate attorney fees.
The consumers brought this action after Maryland's blanket three-year statute of limitations, therefore the lender asserts that this claim should be barred. However, the consumers argue that MCLL is an “other specialty” statute, allowing the claim to be brought within a twelve-year statute of limitations.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presented a certified question of law to the Maryland Court of Appeals: “Whether the MCLL § 12-302's licensing requirement is an "other specialty" subject to Maryland's twelve[-]year limitations period under [CJP] § 5-102(a)(6)?”
Analysis:
The general statute of limitations in Maryland is three years for civil actions. CJP § 5-101. There are exceptions, one of which is a twelve-year statute of limitations for any specialty statute. CJP § 5-102(a)(6).
The Maryland Court of Appeals addressed a similar issue in Master Fin. Inc. v. Crowder, 409 Md. 51 (2009), when addressing whether the Maryland State Secondary Mortgage Loan Law was an “other specialty” and therefore subject to the twelve-year statute of limitations.
The Crowder Test lays out three elements that must be met for a statute be an “other specialty,” making the twelve-year statute of limitations apply:
(1) the duty, obligation, prohibition, or right sought to be enforced is created or imposed solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise exist as a matter of common law;
(2) the remedy pursued in the action is authorized solely by the statute, or a related statute, and does not otherwise exist under the common law; and
(3) if the action is one for civil damages or recompense in the nature of civil damages, those damages are liquidated, fixed, or, by applying clear statutory criteria, are readily ascertainable.
Crowder, 409 Md. at 70.
Applying the Crowder Test, the parties agree that only prong one and three were at issue.
Prong One: The Court of Appeals concluded that the MCLL’s licensing requirement is part of a statutory scheme that includes but is not limited to licensing, interest rates, and attorney fees. Therefore, the licensing requirement is “created or imposed solely by the statute,” and prong one is fulfilled.
Prong Three: The Court held that “readily ascertainable” is not mutually exclusive from the requirement of fact-finding to determine the damages. Readily ascertainable should not be confused with “relative ease of proof.” The Court of Appeals held that the third element is satisfied as the documents and additional information provided by the lender and consumers would allow the damages to be “readily ascertainable.”
The full opinion is available in PDF.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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