Filed: August 14, 2015
Opinion by: Richard D. Bennett
Holdings:
(1) The Maryland Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) applies to the
manufacture of a yacht because the predominant purpose is the provision of a
good with labor incidental thereto.
(2) The UCC applies to the manufacture and installation of a yacht engine
and related parts because the predominant purpose is the provision of a good
with labor incidental thereto.
Facts:
Original Owner contracted with Builder to manufacture a yacht
(Yacht Contract). Builder then contracted
with Engine Company to install an engine on the yacht (Engine Contract). Engine Company provided an engine to Builder,
who physically placed it on the yacht. Before
delivery to Original Owner, Engine Company performed final “hook ups” and
accessory installations, conducted a “PAR Test” and replaced the engine. Then, Builder delivered the completed yacht to
Original Owner. Original Owner died and
his estate sold the yacht to Second Owner, who procured insurance from
Insurance Company. Subsequently, the
yacht sunk and Insurance Company paid Second Owner on the insurance contract. Then, Insurance Company sued Builder and
Engine Company.
Analysis:
The Court determined
the Yacht and Engine Contracts were mixed contracts because they involved both
goods and services. The Court accordingly
applied the predominant purpose test to determine whether these mixed contracts
are controlled by the UCC. The UCC applies
to transactions in goods, which are “movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale.” The predominant
purpose test asks “whether (the contract’s) predominant factor, (its) thrust, (its)
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods
incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a
transaction of sale, labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water
heater in a bathroom).”
The Court cursorily concluded the Yacht and Engine Contracts were
contracts for the sales of goods, with labor incidentally performed. Therefore, the UCC and its four-year statute
of limitations applied and the default three-year statute of limitations in the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code did not apply. The UCC’s statute of limitations ran from the
date of tender of delivery to the Original Owner, which expired over 18 months before the filing of the action, thus Insurance Company’s claims
were barred. Builder’s and Engine
Company’s Motions to Dismiss were Granted pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6).
The full opinion is available in PDF.
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