Thursday, November 5, 2009

Gebhardt & Smith, LLP v. Md. Port Adm'n (Ct. of Special Appeals)

Filed: October 29, 2009
Opinion by Judge Kathryn Grill Graeff

Held: Language in a Lease Agreement stating that the operating expenses payable by the tenants "shall be determined by Lessor's certified public accountant," is not a condition precedent to tenant's obligation to pay these expenses. Further, when a contract provides that a determination rendered by a designated person is "final," that determination is binding on the parties and cannot be contested in court in the absence of fraud or bad faith.

Facts: Gebhardt & Smith, a law firm, leased office space in Baltimore, Maryland, from 1977 until 2006 in the World Trade Center, an office building operated by Maryland Port Administration. The parties executed the lease at issue in 1992 and the tenant agreed to pay per month base rent, plus its proportional share of real estate taxes and operating expenses. The tenant challenged the operating expenses invoiced by the Landlord and did not pay any bills for operating expenses from 2003 to 2006 based upon a provision in the lease that provided that these expenses shall be determined by the landlord's certified public accountant.

Relying on this passage, the tenant argued that it was a condition precedent to its obligation to pay for operating expenses for the landlord to have an independent certified public accountant determine the actual operating expenses at year's end. The tenant also argued it was not precluded from contesting the certified public accountant's calculations as to the accuracy of the operating expenses.

The Circuit Court rejected the tenant's position. It held that the lease does not require an "independent" certified public accountant to determine the operating expenses and that the landlord complied with the lease provisions by employing its internal certified public accountant to determine the operating expenses. Further, the lower court noted that pursuant to the terms of the lease, which stated that the certified public accountant's calculations were "final," the tenant was precluded from challenging whether the operating expenses were calculated correctly.

On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals held the the lease provision at issue does not contain clear language providing that the determination of the operating expenses by the "Lessor's certified public accountant" is a condition precedent to the tenant's obligation to pay these expenses. The lease at issue does not contain language typically used to create a condition precedent, such as a statement that the tenant is obligated to pay operating expenses "if," "when," "after," or "provided that," "Lessor's certified public accountant" determines the operating expenses.

The Court further noted that even if lease contained a condition precedent, that condition had been fulfilled by the audit performed by the landlord's internal certified public accountant (the MDOT Office of Audits). The Court rejected the tenant's argument that the certified public accountant be "independent" should be reasonably implied since the lease referred to "Lessor's certified public accountant" and did not contain the word "independent." In that regard, the Court stated "if the parties to a contract intend that a certified public accountant specified in the contract be 'independent,' the contract would specifically state that requirement." The Court further noted that even if the term "independent" is considered an implied term in this matter, that the Landlord and MDOT Office of Audits satisfied that condition since "Certified public accountants are held to professional, ethical and work standards by the very nature of their training and certification."

Finally the Court held that, where a contract provides that a determination rendered by a designated person is "final," that determination is binding on the parties and cannot be contested in the absence of bad faith or fraud. The Court noted that generally parties to a contract are entitled to turn to the courts to resolve disputes arising from a contract, but that the parties to a contract can waive that right and provide that a designated person has authority to render a final and binding decision.

In order for the contract to foreclose or waive the right of a party to challenge or litigate the conclusions of a third party, the contract must use unequivocal language that unmistakably evidences the parties' intent that the third party's determination is final, binding, and conclusive. The language in the lease in question, that the statement of operating expenses be "determined by Lessor's certified public accountant," was deemed to be sufficient to show that parties' intent that the determination constitutes a "final determination" between the parties that can be challenged only on the narrow grounds of bad faith or fraud.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

1 comment:

  1. One of the of the holdings by the Court in this case seems to be somewhat troublesome. Specifically, Gebhardt & Smith argued that a
    determination by a CPA had to be by an independent CPA. As an alternative argument in support of its affirmance, the CSA held that the CPA Auditor of the MDOT Department of Audits was independent even though one of the parties was the Maryland Port Authority. The Court said as follows:

    Even if the word "independent" could be read as an implied word in the term certified public accountant, however, we believe that condition was satisfied here. Joseph Lambdin, whose testimony the trial court found credible, testified that the MDOT Office of Audits was independent. His testimony is supported by government auditing standards, which provide that a "government internal audit function" can be independent. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS § 3.16 (2007). Moreover, as the trial court stated: "Certified public accountants are held to professional ethical and work standards by the very nature of their training and certification."17 Accordingly, even if the term "independent" is an implied term, the MDOT Office of Audits satisfied that condition. Gebhardt & Smith cites no case holding to the contrary.

    Does anyone think that this threatens every contract or lease where the parties stipulate to some determination an "independent" CPA, since the opinion seems to say that every CPA is, by definition, independent?

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