Filed August 27, 2009
Opinion by Judge Durke G. Thompson
Held: When accelerated rent clauses provide for the payment to the landlord of a lump sum over a lengthy term and also allows the landlord the present possession of the leased premises with no incentive to mitigate its damages, the accelerated rent clause will be found to speculative and unenforceable as a penalty.
Facts: On or about January 23, 2006, Raquel Sales, Inc. (“RSI”) entered into a 10-year shopping center retail lease with Saul Holdings Limited Partnership for space in the South Dekalb Plaza Shopping Center in Decatur, Georgia and a 10-year shopping center retail lease with Briggs Chaney Plaza, LLC for space in the Briggs Chaney Shopping Center in Silver Spring, Maryland. Barefeet Enterprises, Inc. (“BFI”) executed a guaranty for each of the 10-year shopping center retail leases, whereby BFI guaranteed RSI’s performance under the terms of each of the leases, including payment of all obligations and liabilities under the terms of the leases.
On or about August 1, 2007, RSI abandoned the leased space in the shopping center in Georgia and failed to pay the rent and other fees due under the lease since October of 2007. RSI also abandoned the leased space located in Maryland in October of 2008 and ceased paying the rent and other fees due under the lease beginning in November of 2008. Saul and Briggs Chaney filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for breach of lease against RSI and breach of guaranty against BFI seeking damages for unpaid rent and accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of each lease.
The Court ruled that the accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease upon the breach of the lease was not permitted under Georgia law as liquidated damages, but was considered a penalty because the damages were too speculative and uncertain. The Court also found that Saul was entitled to any deficiency resulting from its re-letting of the leased space under its new 5-year lease with a replacement tenant.
With regard to Briggs Chaney, the Court similarly ruled that the accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of the Maryland lease upon breach of the lease was not permitted under Maryland law as liquidated damages but was considered a penalty because it would disincentivize Briggs Chaney from mitigating its damages. Moreover, the Court determined that the length of the remaining lease term was far too long to fairly calculate Briggs Chaney’s damages resulting from RSI’s default. Thus it concluded that RSI was liable only for those damages resulting from Briggs Chaney’s inability to re-let the premises despite it using commercially reasonable efforts.
The Court also found BFI liable to each of Saul and Briggs Chaney for RSI’s default in accordance with the terms of the damage provisions set forth in each respective guaranty.
Analysis: In determining whether the accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease was liquidated damages or a penalty under Georgia law, the Court reviewed previous opinions of the Georgia Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court applied the precedent set by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Peterson v. P.C. Towers, L.P., 206 Ga. App. 591 (1992), where the Georgia Court of Appeals held that accelerated rent provisions were enforceable liquidated damage clauses if the injury caused by the breach was difficult or impossible to accurately estimate, the parties to the lease intended to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the sum stipulated in the accelerated rent provision was a reasonable pre-estimate of probable loss. This lead the Court to conclude that the damages provided for in Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease were too uncertain and speculative and, therefore, a penalty. Moreover, because Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease did not either require Saul to mitigate its damages by re-letting the premises or account for the possibility that Saul would re-let the premises, the Court found that awarding Saul the accelerated rent would provide Saul with present possession of the premises and a lump sum award for the lengthy 7 years remaining in the term, even though the awarded damages bore no relation to the actual damages suffered by Saul.
Although Maryland case law allows parties to a lease agreement to impose liability for rent, damages or any deficiency arising after re-letting premises, the question of whether accelerated rent provisions were permitted as liquidated damages had not been addressed by Maryland Courts. Because Maryland courts have generally enforced liquidated damages provisions that provide for a fair estimate of potential damages at the time that the parties entered into the contract and if the damages were incapable of being estimated at the time the parties entered into the contract, for Section 29(c) of the Maryland lease to be enforceable as a liquidated damages clause it would have to meet that standard. Briggs Chaney argued that Section 29(c) was enforceable as liquidated damages because it provided a reasonable estimate of potential damages by calculating the monthly rent at the amount due at the time of default and not at the increased amounts due in future months. Moreover, it contended that lease alleviated any concerns regarding awarding a lump sum payment of future rent for the remainder of the lease term because Maryland law required Briggs Chaney to mitigate its damages.
The Court ultimately held that Section 29(c) of the Maryland lease was a penalty and not enforceable as liquidated damages because it did not provide a fair estimate of the potential damages that would arise out of RSI’s breach of the lease. Rather, the lease provided for damages that were disproportionate to the damages that might be reasonably expected to result from RSI’s breach. As with Saul, the Court found that by awarding the lump sum provided for under Section 29(c), the Court would be providing Briggs Chaney a lump sum award for payment of rent for the remainder of the lengthy term and, at the same time, would allow the landlord present possession of the premises. As a result, Briggs Chaney would have no incentive to re-let the premises during the remainder of the term.
The Court also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and there is a brief discussion of the procedure and standards to be followed in awarding such fees.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
On November 2, 2009, the Court entered a judgment against RSI in the amount of $704,365.45 and against BFI in the amount of $402,970.53.
Opinion by Judge Durke G. Thompson
Held: When accelerated rent clauses provide for the payment to the landlord of a lump sum over a lengthy term and also allows the landlord the present possession of the leased premises with no incentive to mitigate its damages, the accelerated rent clause will be found to speculative and unenforceable as a penalty.
Facts: On or about January 23, 2006, Raquel Sales, Inc. (“RSI”) entered into a 10-year shopping center retail lease with Saul Holdings Limited Partnership for space in the South Dekalb Plaza Shopping Center in Decatur, Georgia and a 10-year shopping center retail lease with Briggs Chaney Plaza, LLC for space in the Briggs Chaney Shopping Center in Silver Spring, Maryland. Barefeet Enterprises, Inc. (“BFI”) executed a guaranty for each of the 10-year shopping center retail leases, whereby BFI guaranteed RSI’s performance under the terms of each of the leases, including payment of all obligations and liabilities under the terms of the leases.
On or about August 1, 2007, RSI abandoned the leased space in the shopping center in Georgia and failed to pay the rent and other fees due under the lease since October of 2007. RSI also abandoned the leased space located in Maryland in October of 2008 and ceased paying the rent and other fees due under the lease beginning in November of 2008. Saul and Briggs Chaney filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for breach of lease against RSI and breach of guaranty against BFI seeking damages for unpaid rent and accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of each lease.
The Court ruled that the accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease upon the breach of the lease was not permitted under Georgia law as liquidated damages, but was considered a penalty because the damages were too speculative and uncertain. The Court also found that Saul was entitled to any deficiency resulting from its re-letting of the leased space under its new 5-year lease with a replacement tenant.
With regard to Briggs Chaney, the Court similarly ruled that the accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of the Maryland lease upon breach of the lease was not permitted under Maryland law as liquidated damages but was considered a penalty because it would disincentivize Briggs Chaney from mitigating its damages. Moreover, the Court determined that the length of the remaining lease term was far too long to fairly calculate Briggs Chaney’s damages resulting from RSI’s default. Thus it concluded that RSI was liable only for those damages resulting from Briggs Chaney’s inability to re-let the premises despite it using commercially reasonable efforts.
The Court also found BFI liable to each of Saul and Briggs Chaney for RSI’s default in accordance with the terms of the damage provisions set forth in each respective guaranty.
Analysis: In determining whether the accelerated rent due under Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease was liquidated damages or a penalty under Georgia law, the Court reviewed previous opinions of the Georgia Court of Appeals. Specifically, the Court applied the precedent set by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Peterson v. P.C. Towers, L.P., 206 Ga. App. 591 (1992), where the Georgia Court of Appeals held that accelerated rent provisions were enforceable liquidated damage clauses if the injury caused by the breach was difficult or impossible to accurately estimate, the parties to the lease intended to provide for damages rather than a penalty, and the sum stipulated in the accelerated rent provision was a reasonable pre-estimate of probable loss. This lead the Court to conclude that the damages provided for in Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease were too uncertain and speculative and, therefore, a penalty. Moreover, because Section 29(c) of the Georgia lease did not either require Saul to mitigate its damages by re-letting the premises or account for the possibility that Saul would re-let the premises, the Court found that awarding Saul the accelerated rent would provide Saul with present possession of the premises and a lump sum award for the lengthy 7 years remaining in the term, even though the awarded damages bore no relation to the actual damages suffered by Saul.
Although Maryland case law allows parties to a lease agreement to impose liability for rent, damages or any deficiency arising after re-letting premises, the question of whether accelerated rent provisions were permitted as liquidated damages had not been addressed by Maryland Courts. Because Maryland courts have generally enforced liquidated damages provisions that provide for a fair estimate of potential damages at the time that the parties entered into the contract and if the damages were incapable of being estimated at the time the parties entered into the contract, for Section 29(c) of the Maryland lease to be enforceable as a liquidated damages clause it would have to meet that standard. Briggs Chaney argued that Section 29(c) was enforceable as liquidated damages because it provided a reasonable estimate of potential damages by calculating the monthly rent at the amount due at the time of default and not at the increased amounts due in future months. Moreover, it contended that lease alleviated any concerns regarding awarding a lump sum payment of future rent for the remainder of the lease term because Maryland law required Briggs Chaney to mitigate its damages.
The Court ultimately held that Section 29(c) of the Maryland lease was a penalty and not enforceable as liquidated damages because it did not provide a fair estimate of the potential damages that would arise out of RSI’s breach of the lease. Rather, the lease provided for damages that were disproportionate to the damages that might be reasonably expected to result from RSI’s breach. As with Saul, the Court found that by awarding the lump sum provided for under Section 29(c), the Court would be providing Briggs Chaney a lump sum award for payment of rent for the remainder of the lengthy term and, at the same time, would allow the landlord present possession of the premises. As a result, Briggs Chaney would have no incentive to re-let the premises during the remainder of the term.
The Court also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and there is a brief discussion of the procedure and standards to be followed in awarding such fees.
The full opinion is available in PDF.
On November 2, 2009, the Court entered a judgment against RSI in the amount of $704,365.45 and against BFI in the amount of $402,970.53.
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