Jesse Small v. Monty J. Bennett (Cir. Ct. Balto. City)

Filed:  February 5, 2018

Opinion by:  Pamela J. White

Holding:  Demand for attorney's fees and costs incurred prior to the mooting of a shareholder derivative suit (1) failed to satisfy the requirements of the "corporate benefit rule" because the suit was frivolous and causally unrelated to the corporate benefit in question, and (2) failed to meet the requirements for a discretionary award under Maryland Rule 2-703.

Facts:  Defendants are a Texas-based publicly traded real estate investment trust ("Company"), the management group that conducts Company's day-to-day business affairs ("Advisor"), and Company's managing board ("Directors").

Company became a publicly traded corporation in late 2013 and soon entered into an advisory agreement engaging Advisor to perform management functions.  In mid 2015, concerned about a hostile takeover, Directors adopted a poison pill in the form of an amended advisory agreement; one which would impose an onerous termination fee payable by Company to Advisor upon a change in control or termination of the agreement by either side.

Displeasure over the termination fee's size and triggering mechanism was swiftly communicated by a minority shareholder ("Minority") who commenced derivative suits in early 2016.   Minority sued first in Maryland and weeks later in Texas, alleging breach of fiduciary duty for failing to approve candidates for a proxy battle and adopting a termination fee that threatened to reduce the firm's current equity by 50% in the event of a change in control.  Minority was ultimately unable to overcome the business judgment rule presumption and suffered the dismissal of all claims in February 2016.

Though they prevailed in their suit against Minority, Directors were not deaf to the rising noise of discontent.  Between February and April 2016, Directors established a committee to explore negotiation of a termination fee reduction.  Insufficiently placated by the measure, Plaintiff, a separately situated shareholder ("Shareholder") entered the scene and served a demand letter on Directors in April mirroring the claims made by Minority and requesting an investigation and recommendation on the merits of litigation.  

By that time, the record confirmed much of Advisor's and Directors' energies to be centered on the termination fee provision.  Independent directors of Company and Advisor began negotiations and  drafted revisions to the advisory agreement.  An unsolicited takeover offer received Directors' favorable attention and protracted discussions regarding the import and impact of the termination fee.  Directors retained outside counsel to conduct Shareholder's demanded investigation and to report findings at the upcoming December 2016 board meeting.

Directors described these events in several letters to Shareholder between April and October, but Shareholder considered his demand as having been refused.  In October 2016, Shareholder filed a derivative complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City largely regurgitating the content and form of Minority's prior suits: naming the same defendants (Company, Advisor, and Directors) and alleging breach of fiduciary duty with focus on the "unconscionable" fee provision.

Meanwhile, negotiations over the fee provision continued into 2017.  In January, Company's independent directors approved and recommended the amended advisory agreement.  In June 2017 at Company's annual shareholder meeting, shareholders approved the amended advisory agreement which softened its termination fee calculation and trigger mechanism.

That approval served to moot Shareholder's derivative suit; however, arguing that his litigation had led directly to substantial and valuable benefit for Company's shareholders, Shareholder moved for an award in the amount of attorneys' fees and expenses.

Analysis:  The court began by outlining the standard for an award of discretionary fees according to the corporate benefit doctrine, which required Shareholder to demonstrate three elements: (a) that his suit was meritorious when filed, (b) that Directors' action to benefit the corporation was taken prior to judicial resolution, and (c) that the corporate benefit was causally related to the suit.

To the first, the court examined whether Shareholder's suit would have survived the motion to dismiss - and were left wanting.  Shareholder neglected to allege sufficient facts in his complaint to show that Directors had failed to act in accordance with the Business Judgment Rule or made anything other than good faith, informed business decisions.

To the third, the court's examination of the chronology of events led to a finding that neither the termination fee negotiations nor subsequent approval had been causally related to Shareholder's demand letter or threat of litigation.  Instead, the train of activity as to challenging and rectifying the termination fee and trigger mechanisms had already left the station following Minority's suit - and months prior to Shareholder's involvement by demanding an investigation or filing the instant litigation.  Finding insufficient support for the required elements, the court determined Shareholder's litigation to have yielded no corporate benefit.

The court finally turned to Maryland Rule 2-703 which might have permitted a discretionary award in consideration of factors such as (a) time and labor required, (b) novelty and difficulty of questions raised, (c) legal skills required,... (e) customary fees for such services, (f) contingent or fixed fee agreement, (g) time-limiting circumstances,... or (i) experience and ability of counsel, among other factors.  Even had Shareholder been able to meet his burden to show a corporate benefit, his neglect to support the 2-703 showing with sufficient evidence about any of the recited factors and inability to explain or justify the difference between an initial demand for $565,000 and an amended demand for $272,347 were fatal to a request for a discretionary award.

Accordingly, the court denied Shareholder's motion for award of attorneys' fees and expenses.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Greenspring Quarry Assoc., Inc. v. Beazer Homes Corp. (U.S.D.C.)

Filed:  June 26, 2017

Opinion by:  James K. Bredar

Holding:  Where (1) a principal exerts control over a corporation’s board via a majority acting within the principal’s scope of employment, (2) the board takes actions in breach of contract and in contravention of principal’s express statements, and (3) sufficient privity exists to survive a challenge based on economic loss doctrine, well-pleaded allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation against the principal are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

Facts:  Plaintiffs (“Owners”) are members of master and subordinate property owners’ associations in a mixed residential and commercial development.  Defendant (“Developer”) is the developer of the relevant properties.

Development began in 2005, and Developer incorporated master and subordinate owners’ associations one year later.  Soon thereafter, Developer caused its employees to occupy the initial positions on both associations’ boards.  Developer filed on behalf of each association similar covenants under which a management company would maintain common areas, with Developer to pay costs until such time as it transferred title to the common area property to the associations.  Developer began billing Owners in 2008 but did not transfer title to the common areas until December 2015.

Owners, as members of the master and subordinate associations, brought separate but practically identical actions alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation.  Developer removed both actions under diversity jurisdiction and moved to dismiss the tort claims for failure to state a claim.  Removal was granted, and both actions were joined for convenience and efficiency.

Analysis:  Developer first argued that Owners’ allegations sounded only in contract.  The court began by noting that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, because Developer’s employees joined the boards under its direction and in furtherance of its objectives, Developer would be vicariously liable for any tortious acts committed by the board.  By extension, because board members of Maryland non-stock corporations owe the same fiduciary obligations as any other Maryland corporation, breach of duty accompanying a contractual obligation would be sufficient to support a tort claim.  So finding, the court permitted Owners’ tort claims.

Developer next argued that the economic loss doctrine barred any tort claims, such that its alleged negligence causing purely economic harms ought not create tort liability in the absence of privity, actual physical injury, or risk thereof.  However, noting that Maryland has traditionally permitted tort actions for purely economic losses in the context of fraud, and finding more than sufficient allegation of privity between the parties via the intimate nexus between Owners and the associations, and Developer’s control of the boards, the court deemed risk of tort liability reasonably foreseeable.

Third, Developer argued that Owners’ reliance on Developer’s allegedly negligent or fraudulent statements was unreasonable.  Avoiding the factual question of whether reliance was reasonable, the court evaluated the board’s alleged conduct under the adverse domination doctrine, where knowledge or actions of an agent whose interests are adverse to the principal cannot be imputed to the principal.  Because corporate entities act through agents who wouldn’t rationally be expected to communicate their own wrongdoing to the principal, equitable considerations lean in favor of the corporation and create a rebuttable presumption.  Here, a cause of action against the board (and vicariously, Developer) would not accrue if a disinterested majority board could be proven.  In the court’s view, Developer had not alleged sufficient facts to show that the boards contained a disinterested majority during the time period at issue.

Lastly, Developer argued that Owners’ claims failed to meet FRCP Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements that time, place, and contents of allegedly fraudulent statements and the person making such statements be pled with sufficiency.  Finding the complaint to contain sufficiently complete allegations (an accounting of dated bills approved by the boards while under Developer’s control, with identities of the board members responsible), the court found Owners to have met their Rule 9(b) burden.

Accordingly, the court found Owners to have survived Developer’s motions to dismiss.

The full opinion is available in PDF.

Karen R. Goozh v. Howard Richmond (Cir. Ct. Mont. Cnty.)

Filed: July 8, 2014

Opinion by: Ronald B. Rubin

Holding: A stockholders’ agreement that expired upon the “dissolution” of the company was terminated when the company was administratively dissolved for failure to file a regular report, despite having its charter later reinstated when the failure was cured.

Facts: Stockholders in a Washington, D.C., company entered into a stockholders’ agreement that included a provision whereby the agreement would terminate upon the “liquidation or dissolution of the Company.” The company’s charter was then revoked twice after it failed to file a required biennial report with the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs. In each instance, the revocation was eventually annulled, but the Plaintiffs argued that the stockholder’ agreement remained terminated after the first revocation despite such reinstatement.

Analysis: The court noted that a different District of Columbia statute applied to each administrative dissolution of the company. In the second instance, the law stated that when a company’s charter was revoked and later restored, the restoration would “relate back” to the date of the administrative dissolution. In other words, the gap in the company’s continuity would effectively be erased.

The court found two D.C. cases instructive: In Accurate Construction Co. v. Washington, a contract entered into while a company’s charter was revoked was held to be unenforceable, and in T.K., Inc. v. National Community Reinvestment Coalition, Inc., the tenant under a commercial lease was found to have remained a valid party to the lease despite the revocation and subsequent reinstatement of its charter during the lease term.

Finding neither case dispositive, the court said that because the stockholders’ agreement failed to define the term dissolution, the plain meaning of the word should apply. The court acknowledged that the drafters may not have intended a “technical” or “administrative” dissolution of the company to terminate the agreement. Nevertheless, it held that a reasonable person would understand the word dissolution to include such events.

Although the case hinges on D.C. law, the court occasionally draws comparisons with Maryland law and cites Maryland law when discussing the effects of revival.

Full opinion is available in PDF.

Tackney v. United States Naval Academy Alumni Association, Inc. (Ct. of Appeals)

Filed May 14, 2009.
Opinion by Judge Clayton Greene, Jr.

Held: Ordinarily, Maryland courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a voluntary membership organization unless there is evidence of fraud, irregularity, or arbitrary action.

Affirming the Circuit Court's dismissal of a challenge to an election of trustees in a voluntary membership organization for failure to state a claim. Pursuant to the standard elucidated in NAACP v. Golding, 342 Md. 663, 678, 679 A.2d 554, 561 (1996), the Court of Appeals found the board's actions not sufficiently arbitrary to warrant intervention in the organization's internal affairs.

The full opinion is available in PDF.